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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
The first theory is based on the assumption that in cer-
tain cases a person may sacrifice another for himself and
a fortiori that a people may. Its application requires a com-
parison of values. When it is applied in a prosecution for
homicide, it might well be asked, "By what measure is
the comparative value of lives to be measured? Is it to
be strength, or intellect, or what? ' 4 9 A distinction might
well be taken between: (1) cases where the criminal act
inflicts injury on a private person; and (2) cases where
it does not. It might well be for the public interest in the
first class of cases in order to prevent the increase of
crime, to hold that a man should be held to a choice of
evils, injury to himself or criminal punishment, and should
not be allowed to shift his injury to another. On the other
hand, where the criminal act directly injures no individual,
the result of excusing the act is not to allow the shifting
of the burden to another person, but to benefit one at the
cost of allowing an act that ordinarily public policy for-
bids, and it would seem that extreme emergencies might
afford a justification.5 0
The adoption of the second theory involves an abandon-
ment of the retributive and an adoption of the deterrent
theory of punishment. Punishment for deterrence should
be inflicted only where it is possible to deter. Where
deterrence is impossible such punishment should be re-
nounced. A man may have motives adverse to the law of
such great strength as to overcome any fear that can be
inspired by the terror of any legal punishment. He may
be urged to the commission of a crime by motives more
proximate and imperious than any sanction the law can
hold out. In such cases, as the threats of the law are
necessarily ineffective, they should not be made, and their
fulfillment is gratuitous cruelty-the infliction of needless
and uncompensated evil.
W. H. HITCHLER
WILLS - CONSTRUCTION- NEXT OF KIN. IN
RE: Stoler's Estate, 293 Pa. 433, decided by the Supreme
Court, Pennsylvania, June 30, 1928.
Testator in his will gave to his wife a life estate in all
of his property and then provided as follows:
49Reg. v. Dudley, supra.
5OThe stealing bread cases would come in the first class. The
embargo, and liquor cases, in the second. May, Criminal Law, 3rd
ed., sec. 68.
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"At her death I give, devise and bequeath the same
to my next of kin to be divided among them in accordance
with the provisions of the Intestate Laws of Pennsylvania."
After the death of the widow the administrator of her
estate made claim before the auditor distributing the es-
tate of the testator for a share in the latter estate claiming
the wife of testator was embraced in the expression "to
my next of kin" and also contending that the quoted
clause of the testator's will meant "to next of kin in accord-
ance with the Intestate Laws of the State of Pennsyl-
vania."
In affirming the decree of the lower court which sus-
tained exceptions to the auditor's report, our Supreme
Court, per Frazer, J., held that pursuant to Buzby's Ap-
peal,' the general rule of construction is well settled that
a devise or bequest to heirs, heirs at law or next of kin
will be construed as referring to those who are such at
the time of testator's decease, unless a different intent is
plainly manifested by the testator. The Court found no
ambiguity or uncertainty in the language of the testator.
The gift was to such remainder-men as were the next of
kin of testator at the time of his decease and that distribu-
tion was to be made as the will plainly specified "in ac-
cordance with the provisions of the Intestate Laws of
Pennsylvania."
The court further held the words "next of kin" were
used by the testator in their primary sense and accord-
ing to such sense a husband is not next of kin to his wife
and a wife is not next of kin to the husband.2 That the
technical meaning of the words "kin" and "kinship" as
generally used is to denote only persons related by blood
and testator making use of this meaning the words ex-
cluded the wife whose estate might have taken a share
had the testator's language been construed as so intend-
ing under the rule of construction as urged by counsel for
the appellant that if a tenant for life be of the next of
kin, either solely or jointly with other persons, he will
not, on that account, be excluded from participation in
the remainder to next of kin.'
The will in this case became operative before the Act
of June 29, 1923, P. L. 914, a fact not appearing in the
record of this case as reported from the Supreme Court
161 Pa. 111, 116.
2Garrett's Estate, 249 Pa. 249.
3Buzby's Appeal, supra; Stewart's Estate, 147 Pa. 385.
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but explanatory of the reason why this statute was not
the subject of discussion either by the court below or the
Supreme Court.
Under its provisions the construction to be given to
gifts by remainder over to the testator's heirs or next of
kin or the persons thereunto entitled under the intestate
laws or other similar or equivalent phrase shall be con-
strued as meaning the person or persons thereunto enti-
tled at the time of the termination of the estate for years,
for life or upon condition under the intestate laws of the
commonwealth as they shall exist at the time of such ter-
mination, specifically stating furthermore, that such
phrases shall not be construed as meaning such person or
persons as were the heirs or next of kin at the time of the
death of said testator, saving always, nevertheless, the
right of testator to expressly state the construction to the
contrary or where such construction may arise by neces-
sary implication. Had this statute been applied in the
instant case the result would have been the same for the
estate of the widow would have had no semblance of claim
to the fund to be distributed.
A. J. W. HUTTON.
PRACTICE-JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES OF
THE PEACE-ACTIONS FOR DAMAGES BROUGHT
UNDER MOTOR VEHICLE ACTS-The Act of June 30,
1919, P. L. 678, Section 36 provides:
All civil actions for damages arising from the use
and operation of any motor vehicle may, at the dis-
cretion of the plaintiff, be brought in the county where-
in the alleged damages were sustained, and service of
process may be made by the sheriff of the county
wherein the defendant or his registered agent resides
or where service may be had upon him under the ex-
isting laws of this Commonwealth, in like manner as
process may now be served in the proper county.
This provision of the Act of 1919 is amended by Sec-
tion 30 of the Act of June 14, 1923, P. L. 718, as follows:
All civil actions for damages arising from the use
and operation of any motor vehicle may, at the dis-
cretion of the plaintiff, be brought before any alder-
man, magistrate, or justice of the peace, in the county
where the alleged damages were sustained, if the plain-
tiff has had said damages repaired, and shall produce
